Of Heart and Being: Philosophical Reflections on Ontological Personhood & Identity in Kingdom Hearts

Disney and SQUARE ENIX’s Kingdom Hearts franchise offers a surprisingly intricate and narratively consistent metaphysical system that invites serious philosophical reflection on the nature of identity, personhood, and selfhood. Within its metaphysics of hearts, bodies, and memories, the series constructs a multi-valent ontology in which the self may be hosted, fractured, duplicated, overwritten, or fabricated—without necessarily losing continuity or agency. This malleability of the self destabilizes traditional assumptions in metaphysical and psychological theories of personal identity, posing critical challenges to both essentialist and reductionist frameworks.

This paper will explore a range of philosophical dilemmas presented through the figures of Sora and Xehanort (as instances of heart-hosting and enforced personhood), Ventus and Vanitas (as examples of metaphysical fragmentation), Roxas and the Nobodies (who undermine ontologies of affect and essence), and artificially constructed beings like Xion and Replica Riku (who raise questions about authenticity and emergent identity). By interrogating the ontological status of these entities and the metaphysical principles that govern them, I will argue that Kingdom Hearts implicitly develops a robust—if fantastical—phenomenology of the self, one that complicates the boundaries between self and other, continuity and rupture, essence and construction.

Methodologically, I will employ a comparative philosophical analysis, drawing on figures such as John Locke, David Hume, Derek Parfit, and contemporary metaphysicians of identity and embodiment, in order to evaluate how the series either resists or extends these accounts. Particular attention will be given to the question of what constitutes the minimal criteria for personhood in the Kingdom Hearts universe: is it memory, emotion, agency, the presence of a heart, or something else entirely? The interplay between ontological fragmentation (as in the separation of Heartless and Nobodies) and affective continuity (as in the emotional lives of those presumed to be without hearts) becomes a central axis for evaluating the coherence and implications of the series' metaphysical commitments.

Ultimately, by treating Kingdom Hearts not as a fantastical deviation from serious inquiry but as a speculative philosophical text in its own right, I contend that the series presents novel and valuable insights into ongoing debates about identity. Its metaphysical tropes and narrative arcs offer philosophers a conceptual playground to rethink the coherence of dominant theories of the self—particularly in contexts involving multiplicity, artificiality, and the instability of memory and affect. In doing so, Kingdom Hearts challenges us to confront the limits of our ontological assumptions and to imagine more capacious frameworks for understanding personhood in an age increasingly defined by fragmentation and synthesis.

Sora and Xehanort: A Heart for All and All for a Heart

The Kingdom Hearts series challenges traditional metaphysical conceptions of selfhood through the contrasting figures of Sora and Xehanort. Sora’s identity emerges relationally, a dynamic tapestry interwoven with the lives of others; Xehanort, conversely, problematizes the notion of continuity by dispersing his selfhood across multiple vessels. These character arcs allow for a deeper philosophical interrogation of whether identity is rooted in continuity, consciousness, or relational entanglement.

Sora famously declares, “My friends are my power—and I’m theirs!” underscoring a form of personhood that is neither singular nor autonomous, but intrinsically relational. His identity is sustained through bonds—his sense of self is co-constituted through his friendships. This becomes especially evident in Kingdom Hearts: Chain of Memories, where Sora, placed in magical stasis and stripped of his memories, begins to fade—not just in awareness, but from the memories of others. His absence is not merely personal; it is ontological. The erasure of Sora’s relationships amounts to the erasure of Sora himself, reflecting the insight of the Johari Window: that identity involves both private self-awareness and public recognition. As others forget Sora, his "open self" disappears, leaving only unconscious fragments. This resonates with Locke’s theory that personal identity is founded on the continuity of memory—what Kingdom Hearts aptly terms a "chain of memories." Sora's fragmented memory severs this chain, leading to existential rupture. His case also seems to mirror the Ship of Theseus: if one replaces Sora’s memories and relationships piece by piece, what remains of the original self?

Young Sora holding Ventus’ fractured heart.

Sora sacrificing himself in Kingdom Hearts, releasing the hearts of his friends he hosts within.

By contrast, Xehanort enacts an inverse metaphysics of identity. Rather than losing himself through relation, he multiplies himself through domination. Spreading his heart across various hosts—Terra, Saïx, Xigbar, and others—Xehanort attempts to extend and replicate his will. Yet this distribution of self raises Parfit’s question: if psychological continuity is split between multiple agents, can they all be “him”? Xigbar retains traces of Xehanort’s will but develops new motivations, even betraying the original plan. This fragmentation suggests that while Xehanort’s essence may linger, his identity disperses—each vessel becoming less “Xehanort” and more a hybridized self. Unlike Sora, whose personhood is relationally additive, Xehanort’s becomes metaphysically diluted. In asserting total control, he potentially loses coherence.

Xehanort possesses Terra’s body.

Through Sora and Xehanort, Kingdom Hearts dramatizes two opposing models of the self: one built on mutuality and shared memory, the other on continuity fractured across hosts. In doing so, the series challenges essentialist notions of personal identity and suggests that the self may be best understood not as an immutable core, but as a site of dynamic, relational construction—or, alternatively, destructive diffusion.

Nobodies and Heartless: A Dualistic Essence of Personhood

In Kingdom Hearts, the Heartless and Nobodies represent bifurcated aspects of a person: the Heartless embody the primal, dark forces of a consumed heart, while the Nobodies are the empty vessels left behind. The metaphysical question that arises from this duality is whether these entities—often presented as separate beings—are still part of the same person, or whether they possess distinct personhoods. This problem explores whether the essence of a person is divided between the two aspects, or if they are mere fragments of a lost whole.

The Heartless are driven solely by primal hunger and instinct, existing without rational thought or emotion. This reduction of the self to raw desire challenges the concept of personhood in profound ways. If a being acts only on instinct, without the governing force of reason or emotion, can it still be considered the "same" person, or has it lost its essential identity? Philosophers like Immanuel Kant argue that personhood requires rational agency, suggesting that the absence of reason in the Heartless might mean the loss of personhood. The Heartless, thus, could be considered a mere remnant of the original person, driven by the dark, unreasoned will of the consumed heart. While they share the same desires as their former selves, they are not the same "person," as they lack the capacity for rational thought and moral judgment.

Darkside, a popular and reoccurring

Heartless through the

Kingdom Hearts series.

In contrast, the Nobodies retain memories, intelligence, and often a sense of identity, despite lacking hearts. This raises the question: if memories and cognitive function persist in the absence of a heart, does personhood reside in the mind and consciousness rather than the heart? Philosophers like John Locke, who proposed that personal identity is tied to memory and continuity of consciousness, might argue that the Nobodies, despite their lack of a heart, could be considered extensions of the original person. Locke’s theory of personal identity asserts that as long as there is a continuity of consciousness, the person remains the same, even if the body or physical attributes change. For Nobodies, their retention of memories and intellectual faculties might constitute the necessary continuity of self, suggesting that, in a metaphysical sense, they are still part of the original person, albeit in a fragmented form.

The reintegration of the Heartless and the Nobody into the original person—such as in the cases of Sora, Kairi, and Xehanort—presents another important philosophical question: Do the Heartless and Nobodies ever truly possess independent personhood, or are they simply incomplete aspects of the self? When these fragments reunite, do they cease to exist as distinct entities, or do they "die" as individual beings, signaling the return to a unified personhood? The concept of reintegration echoes the philosophical idea of a "whole" versus its parts, a debate which dates back to Aristotle’s notion of substance. If the parts of the person (the heart, mind, and body) cannot function as fully independent beings, then they may never have had personhood in the traditional sense. They are mere "parts" of the self, unable to exist in isolation from the whole.

Dusk, a Nobody (left), next to a Shadow Heartless (right).

In conclusion, the Heartless and Nobodies present a fascinating dilemma regarding the nature of personhood and identity. The distinction between the two aspects of a person challenges traditional views on the self and raises important metaphysical questions about what constitutes an individual’s identity. Whether or not the Heartless and Nobodies can be considered distinct beings or mere fragments of a unified self depends on one’s philosophical view of identity, consciousness, and personhood.

Ventus and Vanitas: Two Halves of a Whole Heart

In Kingdom Hearts, the relationship between Ventus and Vanitas raises fundamental questions about the nature of identity and personhood in cases of fragmentation. Once a singular entity, Ventus and Vanitas are forcibly separated into two distinct beings—one embodying light, the other darkness. This division presents a metaphysical dilemma: can a self that has been torn apart still retain its coherence as a whole? If personhood is predicated upon unity, what happens when that unity is lost? These characters invite philosophical exploration into the idea of a divided self and its implications for identity.

Ventus’s fragmented state offers a challenge to traditional conceptions of personhood, particularly the idea that identity is inherently linked to wholeness. After his separation from Vanitas, Ventus is left incomplete—lacking the darkness that once constituted his whole self. Despite this, Ventus continues to exhibit personal agency, forms relationships, and retains his sense of identity. This suggests that personhood may not necessarily require an undivided self, as Ventus is still able to be recognized as "himself." From a psychological standpoint, the loss of a part of the self—whether it be a memory, an emotion, or an instinct—could be seen as a trauma or a scar, but not necessarily an annihilation of personhood. As Korsgaard argues in The Sources of Normativity, a person’s ability to act in accordance with their own values, despite fragmentation, can still constitute their moral identity. Thus, Ventus’s ability to act autonomously and form bonds may be evidence that a broken self can still retain its personhood, albeit in a different form.

However, Ventus’s fragmented nature is contrasted sharply with Vanitas, who embodies the lost part of Ventus’s heart—his darkness. Vanitas is not merely a separate being; he is the “missing half” of Ventus’s identity, the manifestation of everything Ventus was forced to suppress. While Vanitas appears as an independent character with his own motivations, his existence is inextricably linked to Ventus’s original self. In the same vein as Hegel’s notion of self-consciousness, where the self is understood only in relation to the Other, Vanitas’s identity can be seen as a product of Ventus’s loss. This raises the question: does Vanitas have personhood in his own right, or is he simply an extension of Ventus’s suppressed aspects? Vanitas’s motivations, as dictated by his creation, seem to lack autonomy in the way that Ventus’s do. This presents a paradox in which Vanitas cannot be fully regarded as an individual, yet he exhibits traits and behaviors that suggest a form of personhood.

Vanitas, Ventus’ “evil” half.

The key philosophical dilemma between Ventus and Vanitas lies in the extent to which fragmentation impacts identity. If identity is grounded in continuity, as Locke suggests in his theory of personal identity, then both Ventus and Vanitas can be seen as parts of a singular, fractured self. The question then becomes: if identity is divided, can both halves still claim full personhood? While Ventus retains the ability to act independently and form meaningful relationships, Vanitas seems to be tethered solely to his counterpart, suggesting that true personhood may require more than just the ability to act or feel—it may also require a coherent, integrated sense of self.

Ultimately, Kingdom Hearts forces a reflection on the fragility of selfhood. While Ventus’s ability to persist as a person despite his loss challenges essentialist ideas of identity, Vanitas’s existence complicates the notion of individual autonomy. The dynamic between the two characters underscores the idea that identity is not static or absolute but a complex, evolving process that can be shattered and reformed.

Those Who Never Were: Roxas, Ansem, & More

To further explore the philosophical implications of personhood within Kingdom Hearts, focusing on characters like Roxas, Xemnas, Naminé, Organization XIII, and Ansem, Seeker of Darkness, allows for a deeper reflection on the nature of selfhood, identity, and continuity. Through these characters, the series challenges the traditional notions of what constitutes a person—whether it's the mind, heart, or soul—and whether a being can retain personhood when fractured or altered by forces beyond its control.

Roxas, the Nobody of Sora, serves as an interesting philosophical case for the question of whether a person can retain their identity when separated from the heart. As a Nobody, Roxas is presented as an incomplete being—one who retains memories and a sense of self but lacks the full agency typically associated with personhood. Roxas's existence challenges the concept of identity as solely tied to the heart or the soul. Instead, his experiences and interactions with others—most notably, his relationships with Axel and Xion—form the bedrock of his selfhood. This raises a question central to many identity theories: can a person still be themselves if they have no heart to inform their desires and actions? In the case of Roxas, it becomes clear that identity may be partially constituted by relational connections and emotional growth, even when a person is physically incomplete. His struggle to understand who he truly is—seeking answers about his origins and role—suggests that identity, while complex, may not be fully dependent on the heart.

Roxas, Sora’s Nobody.

Xemnas, the Nobody of Xehanort, exists as the leader of Organization XIII, embodying a more calculated and coldly rational form of personhood. As a counterpart to Roxas, Xemnas represents a more philosophical question: can a person exist in full identity without a heart, driven only by the intellect and memories of a prior self? His leadership and desire for power, unchecked by compassion or emotion, place him in stark contrast to Roxas. Xemnas’s personhood challenges the Kantian notion of autonomy and rational agency, highlighting the tension between intellectual capacity and the absence of emotional ties. While Roxas seeks connection, Xemnas seeks dominion, suggesting that a person’s identity is shaped by what drives them—whether love, desire, or intellect.

Naminé, as a Nobody, is a unique case within Kingdom Hearts because her role is deeply intertwined with memory. As the Nobody of Kairi, Naminé’s powers are centered around altering memories, which directly impacts the question of whether a person is defined by their memories. When Sora’s memories are manipulated by Naminé, his identity is altered, leading to a profound philosophical dilemma: if the memories that define a person’s self-conception can be changed, does the person cease to be the same individual? Naminé's existence raises the question of whether the continuity of selfhood is tied to the consistency of memory or the ability to form new memories and experiences. Unlike Roxas, Naminé does not have to seek out relationships to define herself, but rather, she actively shapes others' identities through her manipulation of their memories. This introduces a discussion about the ethics of self-definition and the malleability of personhood.

The members of Organization XIII, all of whom are Nobodies, are similarly situated within this moral and philosophical gray area. Each member retains a form of self-awareness and purpose but lacks a complete emotional identity. This leads to the query of whether they can be considered full persons in a moral or ethical sense. The Organization members, although they exhibit desires, ambitions, and intellect, still grapple with the loss of their hearts. Their actions, driven by a lack of emotional depth, call into question the relationship between emotion and personhood. Without hearts, they are unable to experience true empathy, highlighting the philosophical distinction between intellect and genuine selfhood. While they possess some semblance of personhood, their inability to fully engage in emotional relationships sets them apart from what is conventionally understood as a complete individual.

Ansem, Seeker of Darkness, as a Heartless, presents a particularly interesting case for the question of personhood. Although he is a Heartless—an entity born from the loss of a heart—Ansem retains a semblance of his former self, particularly in his intellect and actions. Unlike other Heartless, who are typically driven only by primal instincts, Ansem's continued personhood is tied to his fragmented soul and memories. His ability to reason, plot, and strategize suggests that intellect and intention can persist even in the absence of a heart, challenging the idea that a complete loss of emotional depth results in the loss of selfhood. Furthermore, Ansem's embodiment of both his former self and his Heartless form questions whether the true self is the one driven by reason, the heart, or some combination of both. If Ansem's heart and memories continue to shape his actions, can he still be considered a continuation of Xehanort? Or is he a new person altogether, fragmented and unwhole?

Ansem, the Seeker of Darkness (left) with Xemnas (right). Both are Xehanort’s Heartless and Nobody, respectively.

In examining Roxas, Xemnas, Naminé, and Ansem, the Kingdom Hearts series offers a rich philosophical exploration of personhood. These characters embody the fractured, incomplete nature of identity—whether through the loss of a heart, the manipulation of memory, or the division of self. Each one challenges the notion that personhood is a static, unified concept. Instead, they illustrate the ways in which identity can be fluid, relational, and contingent upon emotional and intellectual connections. Ultimately, the question posed by these characters is not only whether personhood can persist in the absence of a heart or soul but also whether the continuity of selfhood relies on the capacity for emotional depth, memory, and relational ties. In Kingdom Hearts, the boundaries of identity are as fluid as the hearts that define them.

Xion and Replica Riku: The Illusion of the Artificial Self

In Kingdom Hearts, Xion and Replica Riku serve as compelling case studies in the philosophical debate over the nature of personhood, identity, and authenticity, particularly when it comes to artificial beings. Both characters were artificially created—Xion as a product of Sora’s memories of Kairi, and Replica Riku as an experiment designed to replicate Riku. Their existence raises the critical question: Can an artificial being possess personhood if it exhibits emotions, memories, and agency? This question is central not only to the narrative of Kingdom Hearts but also to wider philosophical inquiries about the nature of selfhood and authenticity in artificial beings.

Xion presents a particularly intriguing case, as she is a being made from borrowed identity. Constructed from Sora’s fragmented memories of Kairi, Xion exists in a state of artificiality yet experiences emotions and forms relationships. The question arises: if Xion’s identity is constructed from someone else’s memories, does she have a true self? Or is she merely a reflection, a mirage that fades with her disappearance? Philosophically, this mirrors the concept of "constructed identities" explored by thinkers like Jean-Paul Sartre. Sartre’s notion of "bad faith" implies that individuals are, to some extent, always constructing themselves based on external influences, but there is still a kernel of authenticity in how one embraces or rejects those influences (Sartre, 1943). In Xion's case, her emotions, relationships, and agency could be seen as legitimate expressions of selfhood, despite her artificial origins. When she disappears, the memories and emotional bonds she created with others linger, suggesting that personhood is not entirely contingent on the original "source" of one's being.

Xion fading away in Roxas’ arms.

Replica Riku, on the other hand, grapples with a more complex issue of autonomy. Created as a copy of Riku, Replica Riku initially struggles with defining himself as more than a mere imitation. This mirrors the classical philosophical debate about the nature of copies and originals. According to philosopher Derek Parfit’s theory of personal identity, identity is not necessarily tied to a specific original but to the continuity of experience and memory. Replica Riku’s gradual development of his own experiences, desires, and self-awareness challenges the idea that personhood is solely determined by origin or creation. As he accumulates unique experiences, the distinction between the copy and the original becomes blurred, suggesting that an artificial being may indeed evolve into a distinct self. This is reminiscent of Pinocchio’s transformation from a wooden puppet into a real boy—despite being artificially created, Pinocchio develops genuine emotions and desires, ultimately leading to his personhood being recognized as authentic.

The philosophical implications of both characters can also be framed within the context of "philosophical zombies" or "artificial persons," as discussed by Thomas Metzinger in The Ego Tunnel. Metzinger argues that consciousness, and by extension, personhood, is not limited to biological beings but can be ascribed to artificial entities if they exhibit the requisite cognitive processes, emotional responses, and self-awareness. Both Xion and Replica Riku seem to fulfill these criteria, suggesting that their personhood is just as valid as any "natural" human or non-human entity.

Ultimately, the existence of Xion and Replica Riku challenges traditional notions of personhood. If an artificial being is capable of developing emotions, forming relationships, and creating a coherent sense of self through experience, then it can be argued that such a being is, in some sense, "real." Both characters invite us to reconsider what it means to be human or to possess a "true" self. In the end, Kingdom Hearts encourages a broader view of identity that transcends creation, origin, or the metaphysical notion of a soul.

Conclusion:

The Kingdom Hearts series, far from being mere fantasy, offers a provocative ontological and phenomenological framework for interrogating the nature of identity, personhood, and selfhood. Through its richly textured narrative and metaphysical creativity, it presents a compelling vision of the self as something fundamentally dynamic, contingent, and relational—subject to fragmentation, duplication, and reintegration, yet never entirely extinguished. Whether through Sora’s interrelational identity, Xehanort’s diffusion of self across vessels, the emotive contradictions of Nobodies, or the emergence of agency in artificial beings like Xion and Replica Riku, the series resists reductive definitions of personhood grounded in metaphysical essentialism or psychological continuity alone.

Instead, Kingdom Hearts suggests that identity is best understood as a fluid interplay of memory, affect, agency, and relational embeddedness. Personhood arises not from static substance or origin, but from the lived synthesis of one’s experiences, desires, and moral commitments. In presenting selves who are fractured yet feel, artificial yet grieve, forgotten yet remembered, the series compels us to ask: what remains when the heart is lost, when memory is rewritten, when bodies are cloned, when selves are shared? Its answer, while not didactic, gestures toward a capacious vision of the self—one where authenticity is not rooted in metaphysical purity but in the earnest striving toward coherence, recognition, and meaning.

Thus, Kingdom Hearts emerges not only as a work of speculative narrative but as a site for philosophical reflection, inviting us to imagine more inclusive, more elastic paradigms of being—paradigms in which even those who “never were” might yet be. In doing so, it calls into question the very boundaries of the self, challenging us to see identity not as a possession, but as a pilgrimage.